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The Uninvited Guest: The Unexpected Damage to Privacy
from the Expansion of Implied Licenses*

INTRODUCTION
In America, as the saying goes, a man’s home is his castle; it is
the last bastion of privacy and security.1 However, every time we
open our homes to guests, we voluntarily surrender some of our
constitutional right to privacy in the home.2 By hanging a knocker and
building a path to the front door, we implicitly invite strangers—
salesmen, proselytizers, Girl Scouts, and even police officers—to
come to our front door and speak with us.3 But how broadly should
the courts interpret this constructive invitation? In State v. Grice,4 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina went too far by mistaking a narrow
invitation to knock for an invitation to explore nearly all areas of a
property.5
In Grice,6 two detectives acted on an anonymous tip that
ultimately led them to the defendant’s rural private property.7 When
the detectives arrived at the property, one went to the front door to
knock while the other waited in the driveway.8 While standing in the
driveway, one detective noticed marijuana plants growing in the
defendant’s backyard.9 The detectives then seized the marijuana and
later used the plants as evidence to convict the defendant landowner
for manufacturing marijuana.10
* © 2016 Isaac A. Rank.
1. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on the Home,
the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 175–76 (2012) (“Despite the continuing erosion of [Fourth
Amendment] protection in other places, including on the streets, in automobiles, at
airports, and in schools, the home retains a special place in search and seizure law, and
continues to symbolize a zone of privacy often beyond the reach of the modern regulatory
state.”).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J.
1099, 1106 (2009) (quoting State v. Corbett, 516 P.2d 487, 490 (Or. Ct. App. 1973)).
4. 367 N.C. 753, 767 S.E.2d 312 (2014).
5. See id. at 765, 767 S.E.2d at 321.
6. In this Recent Development, references to Grice and the Grice court refer to the
North Carolina Supreme Court decision, not the court of appeals or trial court decisions.
7. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754, 767 S.E.2d at 314.
8. Id. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15.
9. Id. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315.
10. Id. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15.
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Two years before Grice, in Florida v. Jardines,11 the U.S.
Supreme Court firmly limited the activities and purposes for which
police may approach a home while acting under an implied license.12
Yet in Grice, the Supreme Court of North Carolina failed to define
exactly what kind of guests and types of behavior homeowners permit
when they impliedly grant a license to approach their home.13
This Recent Development argues that, by failing to apply the
restrictions set forth in Jardines or even articulate the scope of the
implied license, Grice allows law enforcement officers to perform
warrantless searches on constitutionally protected property. To avoid
such intrusions, this Recent Development urges the courts and the
North Carolina General Assembly to limit the scope of implied
licenses to the standard established by Jardines.
Analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I provides the background
necessary to understand the implied license doctrine, plain view
seizures, and the practice of “knock and talk” investigations. Part II
discusses the facts of State v. Grice. Part III demonstrates how the
Grice court failed to apply precedent by highlighting two flaws in the
court’s interpretation of implied licenses: the effect of Detective
Allen’s extended presence in Grice’s driveway and the implications of
Detective Guseman’s approach of the side door rather than the front
door. Part IV addresses the dangerous consequences of failing to
apply precedent. These dangers include substantially expanding what
law enforcement may do without warrants on private property,
unmooring the implied license doctrine from its legal foundations,
and eroding citizens’ freedom from wrongful search and seizure in
their homes. Finally, Part V recommends three improvements that
would bring North Carolina’s implied license doctrine in compliance
with the Fourth Amendment and ensure the protection of
homeowners’ privacy interests. If implemented, these suggested
changes would alleviate the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the
implied license in North Carolina.

11. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
12. Id. at 1416 (“The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a
particular area but also to a specific purpose.”).
13. See Grice, 367 N.C. at 757, 767 S.E.2d at 316.
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I. IMPLIED LICENSES, “KNOCK AND TALKS,” AND PLAIN VIEW
SEIZURES
A. An Introduction to the Issues: Implied Licenses and Plain View
A basic history of Fourth Amendment privacy protections and
limits on search and seizure reveals how Grice exposes homeowners
to potentially unconstitutional invasions of their privacy interests in
the home. The issues at stake in Grice include the (1) underlying
principles of the Fourth Amendment and the warrant requirement,
(2) implied license doctrine, (3) police investigations under an implied
license, and (4) plain view doctrine.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”14 This protection extends
outside the walls of the home, to the curtilage, which is “the land or
yard adjoining a house [usually] within an enclosure.”15 The warrant
requirement presumptively prevents the search or seizure of private
property absent a warrant issued on probable cause, though
exceptions exist.16 Two approaches have developed to identify when a
Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. The first is the privacyrights doctrine, originating with Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz
v. United States,17 which relies chiefly on citizens’ reasonable
expectations of privacy.18 The second school of thought is property

14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. Curtilage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
16. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1969) (“[O]nly in ‘a few specifically
established and well-delineated’ situations may a warrantless search of a dwelling
withstand constitutional scrutiny[.]” (citation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967))); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“Searches
conducted without warrants have been held unlawful . . . .”); Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 497 (1958) (“It is settled doctrine that probable cause for belief that certain
articles subject to seizure are in a dwelling cannot of itself justify a seizure without a
warrant.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (strongly suggesting a
warrant requirement by stating that the “point of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it
denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Silas J. Wasserstrom, The
Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 267 (1984) (“In Katz,
the Court overturned this property-based interpretation of the fourth amendment, and
extended its coverage to unreasonable invasions of privacy regardless of how
accomplished. From the unarguable premise that ‘the Fourth Amendment protects people
not places,’ the Court reasoned that the relevant question should not be how, but whether
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based, limiting Fourth Amendment protections to the home and
other physical property—a privacy violation occurs only when a
trespass on property occurs.19
A license is a revocable permission given by a land owner to
others, allowing visitors to enter the owner’s land and perform “some
act or series of acts” that would otherwise constitute trespass.20 If an
person is invited onto private property, she has an express license to
enter the property—the same holds true for an officer, who would be
permitted to enter even without a warrant.21 However, even when an
officer does not have a warrant and is not expressly invited, he can
sometimes rely on an implied license to enter the property.22 An
implied license (in contrast to express permission) is not given
verbally—it is “implied from the habits of the country[.]’ ”23 Courts
objectively analyze whether an implied invitation has been extended,
based on local “custom and the appearance of things[.]”24
Additionally, the homeowner’s “expectation of privacy”
reasonably limits the scope of permissible police conduct an implied
license allows.25 The implied license doctrine is therefore intimately
rooted not only in common law property rights but also draws on the
homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy.26 Determining
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists involves a two-part
analysis.27 First, a person must have a “subjective” expectation of

the government has ‘violated the privacy upon which [the individual] has justifiably
relied.’ ” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353)).
19. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1412 (2013) (“When ‘the
Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or
effects, ‘a search within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly
occurred.’ ” (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012))); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated “unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a
seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his
house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure”).
20. License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
21. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415.
22. Id. at 1415–16.
23. Id. at 1404, 1415 (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922) (Holmes, J.)).
24. Id. at 1422 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Kane, 131
A.2d 470, 474 (Md. 1957)).
25. Bradley, supra note 3, at 1106.
26. See id.; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“[A] person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy.”).
27. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and
Seizures § 9 (2010).
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privacy in the location that law enforcement seeks to search.28 Second,
that expectation of privacy must be objectively “reasonable,”
meaning it is one that society recognizes and validates.29 For example,
although an individual might subjectively believe that contraband left
in the open on the front porch is private, most people would not
objectively consider the visible front porch a place where the
individual could reasonably expect privacy.
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant
requirement. The doctrine outlines three requirements for law
enforcement to validly seize an item without a warrant.30 “First, the
police officer must lawfully make an ‘initial intrusion’ or otherwise
properly be in a position from which he can view a particular area.”31
Second, the item must possess some quality to make it immediately
apparent to the officer that she may seize it.32 For example,
contraband is readily identifiable.33 However, even readily
identifiable contraband may not be seized under the plain view
doctrine unless the initial intrusion onto the property is lawful.34
Furthermore, the doctrine “may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.”35 Finally, the third element of the plain
28. See, e.g., Estate of Wasilchen v. Gohrman, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1130 (W.D.
Wash. 2012) (holding that the subjective element of the privacy test can be met only if a
subjective expectation is exhibited by the defendant’s actual conduct).
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he expectation [must] be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”).
30. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736–37 (1983) (plurality opinion). A notable
interpretation of this rule is that objects left in the “plain view” of those outside the area
immediately surrounding a home cannot reasonably be expected to be private. United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 316 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)). Lawful access to a location can be made by
means of an implied license; police, like “newspaper boys, postmen, [and] Girl Scout
cookie sellers[,]” have an implied invitation to enter private property via the front path, on
their way to the residence’s primary entrance. State v. Corbett, 516 P.2d 487, 490 (Or. Ct.
App. 1973).
32. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t must be ‘immediately apparent’
to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466
(1971))). For example, items that are intrinsically illegal for private citizens to possess such
as illicit drugs, explosives, or certain firearms are immediately apparent contraband. See
id.
33. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986) (holding that
marijuana plants that officers observed from a public navigable airspace above a
defendant’s property were adequate to establish the apparent nature of the plants as
seizable).
34. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465–66 (1971).
35. Id. at 466.
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view doctrine requires that the officer have a “lawful right of access”
to the item itself.36 This right of access frequently springs from an
exigency, such as a threat that the item will be removed or
destroyed.37
B.

Supreme Court Precedent

The implied invitation38 is limited to actions that are customary
and usual.39 As a result, the justification for the implied license is
undermined when an officer’s behavior goes beyond what property
owners would ordinarily tolerate from a visitor.40 In Florida v. Riley,41
Justice Brennan’s dissent articulated the principle that “[t]he simple
inquiry whether [a] police officer had the legal right to be in the
position from which he made his observations cannot suffice[.]”42 A
court must also inquire whether the expectation of privacy in the area
searched should be considered reasonable.43 The implied license is
not an absolute privilege assured to police officers at every home. To
the contrary, the license can be “limited or rescinded by clear
demonstrations by the homeowners.”44
The Supreme Court has accepted the practice of “knock and
talks,” as within the scope of an implied license and thus as a valid
reason to enter private property.45 The Fourth Amendment permits
officers without a warrant to approach a home by the front path and
knock on the door for the purpose of interviewing any resident who
answers.46 “The license is limited to the amount of time it would
customarily take [a visitor] to approach the door, pause long enough
to see if someone is home, and (if not expressly invited to stay
longer), leave.”47 However, the Supreme Court has yet to hold
whether and under what circumstances police officers may conduct

36. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 757, 767 S.E.2d 312, 316 (2015) (quoting Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990)).
37. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 464.
38. That is, the invitation that the implied license extends to potential visitors. See
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013).
39. Id. at 1415–16 n.2.
40. See id. at 1416.
41. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
42. Id. at 460.
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
44. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 762, 767 S.E.2d 312, 319 (2015).
45. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1423 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“As the majority acknowledges,
this implied license to approach the front door extends to the police.”).
46. Id. at 1416 (majority opinion).
47. Id. at 1423 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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knock and talks at entrances other than the front door.48 The Court
had the opportunity to follow the Third Circuit’s strong stance on
protecting homeowners’ privacy rights. In 2014, the Third Circuit held
that the knock and talk exception “requires that police officers begin
their encounter at the front door, where they have an implied
invitation to go.”49 But the Supreme Court overturned that court’s
holding.50
Florida v. Jardines illustrates both the shifting landscape of
Fourth Amendment analysis and how the Court might address future
knock and talk cases. In Jardines, the Supreme Court held that the
use of a police drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a house was an
unlawful search because the officers’ activity exceeded the scope of
the implied license.51 Jardines specified that only a limited scope of
conduct is invited by the simple action of “hanging a knocker.”52
Actions that deviate meaningfully from this protocol (i.e.,
approaching the front door, knocking, and waiting briefly) or that are
not “customary, usual, reasonable, respectful, ordinary, typical, [or]
nonalarming” will exceed the scope of the implied license and thus
violate the homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights.53
Moreover, Jardines further limited the scope of a license “to a
specific purpose.”54 While an officer may approach a home and
knock, seeking an interview with the owner even if the officer lacks
probable cause or warrant,55 entry made with any other motive does
not fall within the implied license exception to the warrant
requirement. Visitors, including police officers, are not “impliedly

48. Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 352 (2014).
49. Carman v. Carroll, 749 F.3d 192, 199 (3rd Cir.), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014).
50. Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 351–52 (holding that the Third Circuit erroneously relied on
a previous opinion with respect to knock and talks and also overturning the denial of
qualified immunity for the police officer).
51. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415; see also Carol A. Chase, Cops, Canines, and Curtilage:
What Jardines Teaches and What It Leaves Unanswered, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1289, 1293
(2015) (“[T]he [Jardines] majority opinion—after first reiterating the view that the home
receives heightened protection under the Fourth Amendment—highlighted the fact that
the protection granted to the home under the Fourth Amendment extends to the curtilage
as well.”).
52. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416.
53. Id. at 1415–16 n.2; see also Brown v. State, 392 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of Florida’s warrantless entry
statute). In Brown, police drove up a defendant’s driveway after they saw him on the
porch. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 282–83. Even though members of the public are generally
permitted to walk up the driveway, police did so at 1:45 a.m., when “at that time of night
at his back door, [the defendant] could expect privacy.” Id. at 284.
54. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416.
55. Id. at 1415–16.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (2016)

2016]

STATE V. GRICE & IMPLIED LICENSES

1361

invited to enter the protected premises of the home in order to do
nothing but conduct a search.”56 This is essentially a property-based
analysis that roots the inquiry in trespass law by asking whether the
officers were properly on the private property.57
Jardines focused on whether police had a license to enter the
property58 rather than whether the homeowners had a subjective
expectation of privacy. This is unsurprising because United States v.
Dunn59 left the subjective expectation of privacy prong of the analysis
largely impotent60—even significant efforts and clear demonstrations
of an intent to establish privacy did not invalidate the search.61 The
Dunn Court held that the defendant had not established a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area surrounding his barn even though
officers had to cross a perimeter fence, multiple barbed wire fences,
and a wooden fence in order to reach the barn.62 Justice Brennan
correctly pointed out in his dissent that if Katz’s expectation of
privacy test were correctly applied, the Court would have found that
the defendant expected a barn thus barricaded to be private and that
society would agree that within such a fortress one could reasonably
expect privacy.63 However, because the majority employed a
property-based analysis, the fact that the barn was not sufficiently
connected to the home meant that it did not enjoy the privacy
protections that modern property rights analysis reserves largely for
the home.64 Jardines continued this trend by focusing on implied
licenses, a property rights concept, although one intimately linked to
society’s expectations of privacy.65 The Supreme Court of North

56. Id. at 1416 n.4.
57. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.3(f), at 62 (5th ed. 2012) (describing the Jardines Court as eschewing
“the Katz ‘privacy’ approach in favor of a ‘property-rights’ analysis requiring a
determination of whether the officer’s entry upon the curtilage was outside the
householder’s ‘implicit license’ to visitors because of the officer’s purpose”).
58. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The Court today treats this
case under a property rubric[.]”).
59. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
60. See id. at 300–03 (analyzing only the factors that support an objective expectation
of privacy in the curtilage and not analyzing the individual’s subjective expectation of
privacy).
61. Id. at 303–05.
62. Id. at 303.
63. See id. at 317–19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan criticized the Dunn majority’s
refusal to recognize “farmers’ and ranchers’ expectations of privacy in their barns and
other outbuildings” as expectations society would recognize as reasonable, especially
when “obvious efforts have been made to exclude the public.” Id. at 319–20.
64. Id. at 302 (majority opinion).
65. LAFAVE, supra note 57, § 2.3(f), at 62–63.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (2016)

1362

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

Carolina followed Dunn and Jardines, abandoning the expectation of
privacy analysis for the property-based approach.66 The Grice court
was content, as was the U.S. Supreme Court in Jardines, to instead
undertake a property rights analysis. Although following the Jardines
analysis, the Grice court expanded the implied license doctrine to
allow for a greater breadth of police investigative conduct than
permitted by Dunn or Jardines.
C.

North Carolina and Fourth Circuit Decisions

Precisely how implied license doctrine and related Fourth
Amendment principles interact with and apply to different cases,
including which entrances to the home law enforcement may
approach and the precise limits of the implied license, remains
unclear. Without describing exactly what is allowed during a knock
and talk, the Fourth Circuit has emphasized that the knock and talk
does not confer “the right to make a general investigation in the
curtilage.”67
There is no firm consensus on the degree to which knock and
talks permit law enforcement to encroach on private property, and
courts facing the issue have taken varying approaches.68 The Seventh
Circuit once held that “the Fourth Amendment is not implicated
when police officers approach [a] door in the reasonable belief that it
is a principal means of access to the dwelling.”69 This does not mean
that the approach to a front door is totally unprotected. Rather, a
case-by-case analysis determines the existence of a privacy interest.
The Fourth Circuit has held that in certain cases the curtilage of the
home may retain a protected privacy interest depending on “the
physical attributes of the house and its surrounding land.”70 Privacy
interests are accordingly more robust in secluded or rural areas.71 For
example, a homeowner might not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in an object on the front porch where a passersby on the
street could see it, while nonetheless having a reasonable expectation
of privacy in objects in the backyard because of the more private

66. See State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 756–65, 767 S.E.2d 312, 315–21 (2015).
67. Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 289 (4th Cir. 2001).
68. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 1099.
69. United States v. James, 40 F.3d 850, 862 (7th Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds,
516 U.S. 1022 (1995).
70. United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 994 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that
expectation of privacy are heightened when a house is “screened by trees, is located in an
isolated, rural area with entry provided by a dirt road posted ‘no trespassing’ ”).
71. See id.
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nature of a backyard.72 Similarly, the Second and Ninth Circuits have
found that areas of private property that are considered a “normal
route of access” for anyone visiting the home, such as sidewalks or
driveways, are considered only “semi-private,” as are objects located
there.73
The above concepts are essential to understanding the danger
that the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s holding in State v. Grice
poses to homeowners’ Fourth Amendment rights. When determining
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the homeowner’s
expectation of privacy must be both subjective and recognized by
society as objectively reasonable.74 Moreover, in order for an officer
to make a plain view seizure of an item within Fourth Amendment
protected property, the officer must have had lawful access to the
area in which the item is located.75 Lawful access to make a plain view
seizure can be provided by an implied license.76 Finally, an officer is
impliedly invited and therefore permitted to approach the front door
of a home, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then
leave.77 In State v. Grice, these legal principles should have been
carefully weighed to determine whether the officers lawfully accessed
the area where they found contraband on Grice’s property and
whether they unlawfully seized the contraband.
II. STATE V. GRICE
A. Facts
In May 2011, Detectives Guseman and Allen received an
anonymous tip that defendant Jerry Grice, Jr. (“Grice”) was growing
marijuana.78 They intended to confirm this information by performing
a knock and talk investigation at Grice’s residence.79 The detectives
drove one-tenth of a mile down Grice’s dirt driveway and parked in
the driveway behind defendant’s white pickup truck.80 Grice’s house
72. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. United States v. Hayes, 551 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Magana,
512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1975). But see United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d
1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We recognize that [United States v. Jones] . . . may also affect
the vitality of . . . Magana.”).
74. See supra note 27–29 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 45–47 and accompanying text.
78. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 754, 767 S.E.2d 312, 314 (2015).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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was in a rural setting, “basically by itself in a field.”81 Upon exiting the
vehicle, the detectives encountered dogs and saw that the front door
of the house was barricaded with “plastic wrap” and “furniture
stacked on the front porch . . . .”82 After concluding that a side door
on the house was being used as Grice’s main entrance to the house,
Detective Guseman approached the side door to knock.83 After
calming the dogs, Allen remained “off the porch in the driveway[,]”
and while standing there, he could see into Grice’s backyard.84 At this
point, Allen noticed several potted marijuana plants in buckets about
fifteen yards away.85 The plants were located “to the rear and side” of
an outbuilding that resembled a “homemade shed.”86 After visually
verifying that the plants were marijuana, both detectives crossed the
lawn into the backyard where they then seized the plants.87 The State
later used the plants as evidence to convict Grice of manufacturing
marijuana.88
B.

The Majority Opinion

Chief Justice Martin delivered the Supreme Court of North
Carolina’s opinion in State v. Grice, holding that the implied license to
approach Grice’s home made lawful the detectives’ entry into and
presence on Grice’s property.89 The court justified this holding by a
single invocation of Jardines: “an implicit license . . . typically permits
the visitor to approach the home by the front path.”90 The court
further justified the seizure of marijuana by explaining that “[w]hen
law enforcement observes contraband in plain view, no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists, and thus, the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable warrantless searches is not

81. Id.; New Brief for the State at 4, State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 767 S.E.2d 312
(2015) (No. 501PA12), 2012 WL 8700379, at *3.
82. New Brief for the State, supra note 81, at 4; see also Grice, 367 N.C. at 754, 767
S.E.2d at 314.
83. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15; see also New Brief for the State,
supra note 81, at 4.
84. New Brief for the State, supra note 81, at 5; see also Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767
S.E.2d at 315.
85. Grice, 367 N.C. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315; see also New Brief for the State, supra
note 81, at 5.
86. New Brief for the State, supra note 81, at 5.
87. Grice, 367 N.C. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315; see also New Brief for the State, supra
note 81, at 5.
88. Grice, 367 N.C. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315.
89. Id. at 754, 762, 767 S.E.2d at 314, 319.
90. Id. at 757, 767 S.E.2d at 316 (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415
(2013)).
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violated.”91 In fact, because the court held that no privacy interest can
exist in an object found in plain view, the court found that no search
occurred at all.92 The Grice court’s application of this bright-line rule
precluded a more fact-specific, contextualized analysis of whether the
defendant could reasonably expect the plants to be private.
Although the Grice court invoked Jardines to establish the
implied license that justified the detectives’ entrance onto the
defendant’s property,93 the quoted language only permits a law
enforcement officer to approach a home’s front door. Jardines’s
language furnishes no justification for the detective’s lingering on the
driveway, entering the backyard, or approaching the side door.94
Accordingly, the Grice court did not fully consider law enforcement’s
practice of knock and talk investigations or the appropriateness of
officers approaching a side door when conducting such
investigations.95 Further, the court did not investigate whether Grice
had a subjective expectation of privacy in his backyard or if such an
expectation was objectively reasonable.96 If the court had discussed or
fully considered these well-established doctrines, the result of this
case may have been different.
C.

Justice Hudson’s Dissent

Justice Hudson’s dissent, however, touched on some of these
issues and other potential problems with the plain view seizure of the
marijuana plants in Grice’s backyard.97 She noted that an observation
made by an officer who is “located outside of a constitutionally
protected area and is looking inside that area” is engaged in a

91. Id. at 756, 757 S.E.2d at 315–16 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15
(1986)).
92. Id., 767 S.E.2d at 316 (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)).
93. Id. at 757, 759, 767 S.E.2d at 316, 318 (“[The] implicit license . . . typically permits
the visitor to approach the home by the front path . . . . [T]he knocker on the front door is
treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by
solicitors, hawkers and peddlers[.]” (emphasis added) (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.
Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013))).
94. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013); see also Grice, 367 N.C. at
757–59, 767 S.E.2d at 316–18 (naming the “sole point of contention” to be whether the
officers had a lawful right of access to the contraband from the driveway). If the Grice
court intended to narrowly interpret Jardines, it did so implicitly. Had it done so expressly,
homeowners would better understand the extent of their privacy interests.
95. Compare Grice, 367 N.C. at 757–59, 767 S.E.2d at 316–18 (majority opinion), with
id. at 768–69, 767 S.E.2d at 323–24 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 754–65, 767 S.E.2d at 314–21 (majority opinion).
97. Id. at 767–70, 767 S.E.2d at 322–24 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
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“preintrusion” observation.98 Observations of contraband made from
a preintrusion standpoint are properly classified as “open view” and
not “plain view” observations.99 The substantive difference between
“open view” and “plain view” observations is that an “open view”
observation does not occur from within a Fourth Amendment
protected area. Further, “open view” observations do not confer a
right of access to the object absent exigent circumstances—they
merely confer probable cause sufficient to obtain a warrant.100 In
Grice, because the contraband was located in a protected area—the
backyard101—and the detectives observed it while outside of the
protected area, they had only an open view of the marijuana plants
and therefore no right of access absent a warrant or exigent
circumstances.
When an officer sees contraband in “open view”—i.e., from
outside the protected area—only a warrant or exigent circumstances
justifies entering the Fourth Amendment protected area.102 Justice
Hudson concluded that there were no exigent or suspicious
circumstances in this case.103 In her view, the only facts supporting an
exigency were the chance that someone might be home and that the
plants could in theory be removed or destroyed.104 She found no
indication that the plants would be destroyed or even that the
detectives had made their presence known to anyone in the home.105
Because there was no evidence that the plants would be destroyed,
Justice Hudson found that there was no legitimate reason for the
detectives to seize the plants without a warrant.106 She reasoned that
the detectives could easily have called in for a warrant, obtained one,
and then returned to confiscate the property. As Justice Hudson
implied, the majority’s holding sets a dangerously low bar for what

98. Id. at 767, 767 S.E.2d at 322; see also Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349, 352 (Fla. 1981)
(defining a preintrusion as when “the officer is located outside of a constitutionally
protected area and is looking inside that area”).
99. Ensor, 403 So. 2d at 352.
100. Id. For a detailed explanation of the “plain view” doctrine, see Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464–73 (1971).
101. Grice, 367 N.C. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315.
102. Ensor, 403 So. 2d at 352; see also Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932)
(holding that evidence of a possible crime “does not strip the owner of a building of
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search”).
103. Grice, 367 N.C. at 768–69, 767 S.E.2d at 323 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 769, 767 S.E.2d at 323–24.
106. Id.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (2016)

2016]

STATE V. GRICE & IMPLIED LICENSES

1367

constitutes exigent circumstances and threatens to eliminate the
warrant requirement in many cases.107
III. THE GRICE COURT’S EXPANSION OF IMPLIED LICENSE
DOCTRINE
By failing to condemn or even analyze the detectives’ actions, the
Grice court paid little heed to the Supreme Court’s principle that “an
officer’s leave to gather information is sharply circumscribed when he
steps off [public] thoroughfares and enters the Fourth Amendment’s
protected areas.”108 In doing so, the Grice court handed down an
overly generous interpretation of the scope of the implied license, the
implications of which are troubling for the future of Fourth
Amendment protection of the home.
The events in Grice transpired on Fourth Amendment protected
property. In North Carolina, it is generally agreed that driveways,
pathways, porches, lawns, and other areas that must be traversed in
order to reach the front door of a private house are classified as
“curtilage.”109 Those locations are, therefore, protected by the Fourth
Amendment and may not be intruded on by law enforcement without
a warrant or a valid exception.110 Such an exception might be an
implied license or perhaps a direct invitation inside by the owner.111
Given the scope of Fourth Amendment protections, a court should be
absolutely certain that an officer without a warrant has proper license
to enter a property before the court allows any seizure of objects
within the property. Unfortunately, the question received little
attention from the Grice court.112 This is likely because the defendant
did not contest the validity of the license at trial and neither statute
nor case law clearly establishes the scope of implied licenses.113 In any
case, the issue of implied licenses deserved greater analysis in this
case.

107. Id. at 769, 767 S.E.2d at 323.
108. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013).
109. Grice, 367 N.C. at 759, 767 S.E.2d at 317 (“[T]he curtilage of the home will
ordinarily be construed to include at least the yard around the dwelling house as well as
the area occupied by barns, cribs, and other outbuildings.” (quoting State v. Frizzelle, 243
N.C. 49, 51, 89 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1955))). The Fourth Amendment doctrine of curtilage is
vast and complicated and is beyond the scope of this Recent Development.
110. Id.
111. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (explaining that visitors using an implied license do
not have to leave if they have been invited to stay).
112. See Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–65, 767 S.E.2d at 314–21; supra Section II.B.
113. Grice, 367 N.C. at 757, 767 S.E.2d at 316.
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This Part analyzes two major issues presented by Grice, each of
which, if more fully considered by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, may have changed the court’s conclusion that the detectives
were acting within the scope of an implied license: (1) the effect of
Detective Allen’s extended presence in Grice’s driveway; and (2) the
implications of Grice’s barricaded front door.
A. Detective Allen’s Extended Stay in the Driveway
The Grice court found that Detective Allen was properly on
Grice’s land,114 even though Allen exceeded the traditional limits of
the implied license—to approach the front door, knock, wait briefly
to be received, and, if no one comes to the door, to leave.115 Rather
than approaching the home by the front path and knocking promptly,
Detective Allen, after calming some dogs that ran out to him,
remained standing in the driveway instead of approaching the door.116
Further, while standing there, the detective scanned the house and
curtilage and spotted the buckets containing marijuana.117 Whether
conducting a search or merely loitering, Detective Allen’s actions
were outside the scope of the implied invitation to a person who
approaches the front door.118
Although the Grice court quoted Jardines, noting that “an
implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by
the front path[,]”119 the court conducted no further analysis as to
whether the detectives were properly on the defendant’s land.
Admittedly, a factual finding may have shown that, in the defendant’s
neighborhood, it is acceptable when two people are visiting together
for one visitor to go to the door while the other visitor waits at a
distance, but no such findings were made.120 Furthermore, the Grice
court overlooked a qualification that Jardines made clear: “the scope
of a license . . . is limited not only to a particular area but also to a
specific purpose.”121 The facts suggest that Detective Allen did not
intend to knock and obtain an interview with the resident of the
114. See supra Section II.B.
115. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415.
116. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 315.
117. Id. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315.
118. That is, “to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to
be received, and then (absent an invitation to linger longer) leave.” Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at
1415.
119. Grice, 367 N.C. at 757, 767 S.E.2d at 316 (quoting Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415).
120. See supra notes 38–53 and accompanying text (describing “custom” as the guiding
principle of the implied license).
121. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416.
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house; he remained in the driveway to look and observe.122 The Grice
court may have overlooked this limit on the scope of the implied
license because courts are generally hesitant to allow the validity of a
search to hang on the “subjective intent of the officer.”123 But this
principle should not apply to plain view seizures in this state. The
North Carolina General Assembly only permits warrantless seizures
of plain view evidence if the discovery is inadvertent124—essentially
requiring that the officer neither anticipate finding the evidence nor
know its location in advance.125 Because the legislature has already
determined that an officer’s subjective mental state is important to a
search or seizure’s validity, it should be considered equally as
important to the license analysis as well.
In Jardines, the Supreme Court instructed that “no one is
impliedly invited to enter the protected premises of the home in order
to do nothing but conduct a search,”126 but it did not address whether
the customary invitation allows multiple officers to provide backup
for an officer on the premises.127 Detective Allen may have
overstepped the boundary of the implied license by waiting in the
driveway, inspecting his surroundings, and looking into the
backyard.128 However, it may well be that careful inspection of his
surroundings was essential for Allen to properly support and protect
his partner who was knocking on the door. It could additionally be
argued that calming the dogs in the driveway was essential for police
safety129—though the record does not indicate that the dogs were
aggressive.
Had the Grice court fully examined Detective Allen’s prolonged
stay in the driveway, it is likely that the court would have found that
Allen’s actions exceeded the scope of the implied license. At the very
least, by analyzing Allen’s behavior, the court could have clarified
122. See Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–65, 767 S.E.2d at 314–21.
123. See, e.g., Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (holding that subjective intent is irrelevant
when a search is objectively reasonable); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990)
(holding that the requirement that an officer’s discovery of evidence in plain view be
inadvertent is not an effective standard because “evenhanded law enforcement is best
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that
depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer”).
124. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-253 (2013) (“If in the course of the search the office
inadvertently discovers items not specified in the warrant which are subject to seizure
under G.S. 15A-242, he may also take possession of the items so discovered.”).
125. See Horton, 467 U.S. at 138 (defining inadvertent discovery).
126. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416.
127. See id. at 1409–18.
128. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
129. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 754–55, 767 S.E.2d 312, 315 (2015).
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that in North Carolina visitors are impliedly invited to linger in the
driveway. Doing so would have allowed homeowners to better
understand the limits of their privacy interests in their own property.
It should also be noted that Detective Guseman, who actually
intended to and did go up to the door and knock, did not notice the
plants—likely because he was busy performing the legitimate purpose
of his entry.130 Lastly, even failing to examine the detective’s lengthy
stay in the driveway, the court should have more fully considered
whether the furniture obstructing the front door limited the scope of
the implied license.
B.

Furniture Barricading the Door and Detective Guseman’s
Approach of the Side Door

The Grice court also neglected to consider whether the
defendant created a reasonable expectation of privacy by limiting the
scope of the implied license to enter his land. As previously discussed,
a homeowner impliedly invites guests to enter his property by
hanging a knocker.131 But in Grice, the proverbial knocker certainly
was not hung. On the contrary, the front door was barricaded with
furniture and covered with plastic.132 It seems troubling that even
when a person has barricaded the door of his house, there was not
even a whisper from the Grice court wondering if the implied license
might have been revoked. By way of example, several circuits have
held that a homeowner may limit the license and create a reasonable
expectation of privacy on his curtilage by surrounding it with a fence
and gate.133 Nor did the Grice court consider the fact that there was
no path or sign directing visitors to the driveway or to the side door,134
which could suggest that Grice neither invited nor expected members
of the public to be in the driveway or at the side door.135 Perhaps no
guest had ever discovered, much less attempted to use this side door
at the end of a long, dirt driveway in a rural area.136 By remaining

130. See id. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315.
131. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (“We have accordingly recognized that ‘the knocker on
the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to
the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.’ ” (quoting Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951))).
132. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754, 767 S.E.2d at 314.
133. United States v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that land
surrounded on three sides by fences contributed to the finding of the area as protected by
the Fourth Amendment); Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1974).
134. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754, 767 S.E.2d at 314.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 754, 767 S.E.2d at 314.
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silent, the court implied that even if the defendant could reasonably
expect privacy in his backyard, that privacy interest was overborne by
the legitimate state interest in seizing contraband, even in the absence
of exigent circumstances.137 Because the front door was barricaded,
Grice arguably directed visitors to the functioning side door. But if so,
the court should have explained its analysis while also taking care not
to hold that law enforcement may approach any or all doors and
windows when the front door is unavailable.
Essentially, the Grice court conflated the first requirement of the
plain view analysis—lawful access—with the third requirement—an
immediately apparent right to seize the object.138 Even assuming that
the detectives had a right to seize contraband, their search failed to
meet the requirements of the plain view doctrine because the
detectives did not have lawful access to the side of the house.
Even ignoring the implications of the barricade, the court should
not have ignored that an implied license usually grants permission to
approach only the front door.139 Because the detectives approached
the side door in this case,140 the court should have paid greater
attention to whether this conduct was proper. The local custom may
well have permitted a visitor to go to a side door if the front door was
blocked. The physical layout of the Grice property may have
warranted using the side door. If the Grice majority had allowed the
officers to approach the side door on either of these bases, the
holding would be relatively narrow and fact specific. The opinion
should have established that knocking on side doors, back doors, or
windows is not appropriate in every case but must be specifically
invited by the physical layout of the property or by local custom.
Given this confusion, Detective Guseman might have exceeded
the scope of his invitation when he approached the side door.
Different circuits have established different rules detailing when
approaching side doors is appropriate. The Fourth Circuit allows
officers to approach a door other than the front door only under
certain circumstances, such as when a homeowner’s car is parked in
the residence, but no one answers the front door.141 Other

137. Id. at 762, 767 S.E.2d at 319.
138. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990) (listing the requirements of
the plain view test).
139. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013); cf. Lakin v. Ames, 64 Mass.
(10 Cush.) 198, 220 (1852) (holding that licenses are created and also limited by the local
customs).
140. See Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 315.
141. See United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1099–1100 (4th Cir. 1974).
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jurisdictions have looser standards, allowing an officer to approach
another door only when she reasonably believes that the side door is
used as the primary entrance.142 In Grice, rather than approaching by
the front path and knocking at the front door, Guseman went up the
driveway, around to the side door,143 possibly exceeding the spatial
limits of the implied license.
The classification of the side door as the main entrance had a
serious impact on the defendant’s privacy interests. But the court
engaged in no inquiry as to whether this classification was
warranted.144 This is particularly troubling because scope of license
issues are highly fact-bound inquiries with no apparent bright line
rules. The court should have clarified these murky areas of the law.
The Grice court allowed the detectives to approach the side door
because the detectives determined that the side door appeared to be
the main entrance.145 In many cases this standard will not be
problematic, but the court should take care to ensure that an officer’s
belief about which entrance is the main entrance is a reasonable one.
Wholesale deference to an officer’s subjective beliefs would make it
too easy to erode the protections of the home and its curtilage.
In sum, the Grice decision is problematic due to its cursory
analysis. The court started and ended its inquiry by finding that the
officers’ initial presence on the property was for the purpose of
conducting an interview.146 Instead, the Grice court should have
continued the required fact-based inquiry. First, the court should have
inquired whether the officers’ continued presence on the property fell
within the implied license. Second, the court should have examined
the officers’ actions after they realized the front door was barricaded
and no one appeared to be home. The initial purpose of their
presence—to conduct an interview—was mooted. Finally, the court
should have found that the officers’ continued presence on the
142. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279–80 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when officers reasonably
believed that the back door—a door readily accessible to the public—was the apartment’s
main entrance); United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding
officers’ approach to a back door when the front door was inaccessible and the officers
engaged in a legitimate effort to interview the defendant rather than attempting to
observe whether unlawful activity was underway).
143. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15.
144. See id. at 754–65, 767 S.E.2d at 314–21 (setting forth as an accepted fact that “the
driveway led to a side door, which appeared to be used as the main entrance,” while
ignoring the issue in the legal analysis).
145. Id. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15.
146. Id. at 758, 767 S.E.2d at 317 (“Here, the knock and talk investigation constituted
the initial entry onto defendant’s property[.]”).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (2016)

2016]

STATE V. GRICE & IMPLIED LICENSES

1373

property was for the purpose of finding contraband, an unlawful
justification for encroaching on Fourth Amendment protected
property.
Jardines stands for the proposition that the Constitution
continues to limit officers to certain actions and purposes even after
an officer initially enters property for the purpose of conducting an
interview.147 This Recent Development urges that if officers
undertake acts inconsistent with a legitimate purpose, courts should
consider the scope of the implied license to be breached. If state
courts do not fully analyze the actions of officers on a case-by-case
basis, they simply cannot uphold the Constitution.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF GRICE
By eschewing a case-by-case analysis and not confining police
actions on private property to a fixed and limited protocol, the Grice
court created a dangerous precedent for North Carolina. First, the
decision permits an overly broad range of police actions—including
generous exemptions for safety—to infringe on Fourth Amendment
protections. Second, it allows officers to exceed specific, legitimate
purposes, which encourages exploratory behavior. Third, it
encourages violations of homeowners’ reasonable expectations of
privacy.
A. Broad Range of Police Actions
If the law does not require police to adhere to a specific protocol
while on private property, some deviations may be harmless, but
others may be alarming, invasive, and unconstitutional. The risk of
violating constitutionally protected property rights is too great to
refrain from instituting a more stringent protocol. Justice Scalia noted
in Jardines that “to spot [a] visitor exploring the front path with a
metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the garden before
saying hello and asking permission, would inspire most of us to—well,
call the police.”148 Allowing officers to lurk and loiter on the driveway
and front porch, peering through windows for as long as they like,
seriously threatens the privacy interests at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment. When officers are given such freedom, all but the
darkest corners of a home are in “plain view.”
This is no mere hollow prediction; in some jurisdictions this is
becoming the reality. The Ninth Circuit has allowed police to walk
147. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013).
148. Id. at 1416.
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completely around the house “for officer safety reasons” and to
“attempt to locate someone with whom they could speak[,]”149 or to
stand on tires to look over a fence into a person’s backyard.150
Similarly, the First Circuit has permitted police to go to the back of
the house and peer in a kitchen window because the front door was
inaccessible.151 Such privileges run contrary to the logical and legal
basis of an implied license. Would a reasonable person, when
deciding not to answer the door, expect a visitor to walk around the
house peering in windows in an exploratory manner? Should society?
If not, these actions likely violate the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” described in Katz and Jardines, and should not therefore be
permitted.152 An extension of licenses to engage in exploratory
behavior on a homeowner’s property will devastate North
Carolinians’ Fourth Amendment interests.
Perhaps it is necessary to provide police with broad discretion to
decide how to carry out their duties, in order to allow them to
perform their jobs safely. Officer safety is often used to justify actions
that seemingly exceed the implied license, such as allowing officers to
secure an area by circling a house153 or permitting Detective Allen to
stand watch in the driveway to provide back-up for his partner.154 It is
worth asking whether actions necessary for police safety should lie
within the scope of the implied license. The court might have
correctly reasoned that by building a path to his door, a homeowner
implicitly licenses police (and other visitors) to approach his door in a
reasonably safe way. On the other hand, a homeowner does not
guarantee that all visitors will be protected from all injuries, and the
police—like all others—must assume some minor risks when
approaching private property. The Fourth Amendment does not
permit protective sweeps of private property to be used as a substitute
for a warrant, absent reasonably convincing evidence of a potential
risk.155 If a police officer testified that it was safer for him to batter
down the doors of a home and search every room and closet, such
testimony alone would not defeat the Fourth Amendment
requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable: “[Fourth
149. United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001), overturned in part
by United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 2012).
150. United States v. Wheeler, 641 F.2d 1321, 1327 (9th Cir. 1981).
151. United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir. 1990).
152. See supra Section I.B.
153. See, e.g., Hammett, 236 F.3d at 1060 (allowing the officer to circle the house to
locate another door out of concern for officer safety).
154. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 754–55, 767 S.E.2d 312, 315 (2015).
155. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
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Amendment] jurisprudence contemplates that protection of
individual rights of privacy will be achieved at some cost to society’s
interest in public safety[.]”156 A balance can and should be achieved
between safety and privacy interests.
B.

Specific Purposes

Jardines requires that the scope of a license be limited to a
specific purpose.157 Homeowners do not typically invite guests onto
their property for the sole purpose of conducting searches.158 Seeing a
stranger performing searches in one’s yard would greatly alarm a
reasonable homeowner. Extending licenses for officers to perform
searches that a homeowner would rarely if ever consent to therefore
undermines the justification for the implied license. Under such a
rule, an officer may enter not only to interview the resident but even
to stand in the driveway casting his eyes about searching for
contraband not visible from a public road.159 In Grice, Detective
Guseman actually intended to approach the front door and knock;
likely because he was busy performing the legitimate purpose of his
entry, he did not notice the plants, though his partner, loitering in the
driveway, did.160
An officer’s intent meaningfully affects what she might find
during a knock and talk. However, an officer should not need to
shield her eyes so long as they are fixed on a legitimate purpose.
Embracing a subjective standard that validates only those knock and
talks performed with the legitimate purpose of an interview is in
keeping with North Carolina precedent.161 It would constrain an
officer’s activities to conduct that a homeowner would impliedly
consent to and would reduce the privacy interests surrendered by the
homeowner to the minimum required for the officer to do his job.
Although subjective standards are difficult to apply—because it is
easy for an officer to lie about why she went to a certain location and
courts often defer to officer testimony—the specificity of the knock
and talk protocol makes subjective intent relatively easy to discern. If
the officer deviates from the path to the door, performs an unusual
action, or delays unnecessarily, it will alert the court that the officer

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 1986).
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013).
Id. at 1415–17.
See Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15.
See id.
Id. at 757, 767 S.E.2d at 316.
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has also turned away from the legitimate purpose and therefore
breached the implied license.
C.

Homeowners’ Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Lastly and perhaps most dangerously, the Grice court seems to
treat implied license doctrine as an exception to the rule articulated in
Jardines: Reasonable expectations of privacy may protect areas
unprotected under the traditional property theory of the Fourth
Amendment, but the absence of such expectations of privacy cannot
negate Fourth Amendment protections “when the Government does
engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected
area[.]”162 Yet the implied license doctrine seems to permit seizures of
property within plain view of the curtilage between a public street and
the front door, precisely because there is neither a subjective
expectation of privacy nor an objectively recognized privacy interest
in such an area.163 Objectively low expectations of privacy do not
subtract from Fourth Amendment protection of private areas,
including the home; this baseline protection is all that guards the
people against the government invading all areas of privacy by
announcing Orwellian searches and surveillance.164 If searches like
those performed in Grice or the Ninth Circuit cases mentioned were
to become commonplace, Americans could suffer significantly

162. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1409, 1414 (emphasis removed) (quoting United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
163. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Grice, 367 N.C. at 757–58, 767
S.E.2d at 316–17.
164. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (“Situations can be imagined,
of course, in which Katz’s two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of
Fourth Amendment protection. For example, if the Government were suddenly to
announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation
of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a
totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation’s traditions, erroneously assumed that police
were continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of
privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances,
where an individual’s subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to
well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously
could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection was.”); cf. Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for
Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 583–87 (1989) (arguing the Supreme
Court has favored law enforcement over privacy); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 211–12
(1949) (“A Party member lives from birth to death under the eye of the Thought Police.
Even when he is alone he can never be sure that he is alone. Wherever he may be, asleep
or awake, working or resting, in his bath or in bed, he can be inspected without warning
and without knowing that he is being inspected.”).
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diminished privacy in their backyards and homes.165 Everything not
shuttered away behind curtain-drawn windows would be considered
in plain sight.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
To preserve and perhaps restore the privacy interests guarded by
the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court of North Carolina and
the North Carolina General Assembly should take four concrete steps
to establish workable, safe boundaries for the protection of privacy in
the home. First, North Carolina should adopt a “categorical
approach” to privacy protections, as recommended by Justice
Hudson’s dissent in State v. Grice;166 second, the State should establish
a fixed and reasonable protocol to govern the actions of implied
licensees, particularly law enforcement officers; third, the State
should reemphasize Katz’s expectation of privacy analysis; and
fourth, the State should limit the purposes for which an officer may
enter Fourth Amendment protected property without a warrant.
There could conceivably be many other standards that would serve
this same purpose, but these recommendations are drawn from the
principles and suggestions highlighted by Justice Hudson and various
U.S. Supreme Court Justices as important.
A. Adopt a Categorical Approach to Privacy Protections
Adopting a categorical approach to privacy protections, as
recommended by Justice Hudson’s dissent in State v. Grice,167 would
increase privacy protections in North Carolina. Justice Hudson notes
that an officer who is “located outside of a constitutionally protected
area and is looking inside that area” is engaged in a “pre-intrusion”
observation.168 A categorical approach would distinguish between
“open view” and “plain view” observations. Observations of
contraband made from a “pre-intrusion” standpoint are properly
classified as “open view” and not “plain view” observations.169 The
substantive difference between an “open view” and “plain view”
observation is that an “open view” observation does not occur from
within the Fourth Amendment protected area and does not confer a
right of access to the object; instead, an “open view” observation

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See supra notes 149–50.
Grice, 367 N.C. at 767–68, 767 S.E.2d at 322 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 767, 767 S.E.2d at 322; see Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349, 352 (Fla. 1981).
Ensor, 403 So. 2d at 352.
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merely confers probable cause.170 When law enforcement sees
contraband in “open view”—i.e., from outside the protected area—
the law requires a warrant or exigent circumstances to justify entering
the Fourth Amendment protected area.171
As Justice Hudson noted in her dissent, applying the “open
view” doctrine could transform the outcome of cases like Grice.172
The license by which the detectives entered the defendant’s land
limited their lawful access to specific parts of the curtilage.173 This
strongly suggests that until the officers spotted the plants in the
backyard and left the driveway, there was no prior valid intrusion of
that part of the curtilage.174 Consequently, absent exigent
circumstances such an intrusion of the Fourth Amendment protected
property would not be permitted under the “open view” doctrine.175
B.

Establish a Fixed Protocol

Establishing a fixed protocol for how licensees operate ensures
that courts do not condone violating the Constitution. Under
Jardines, certain extreme acts exceed the scope of an implied license;
these include “peer[ing] into the house through binoculars,”176
investigating the curtilage with trained drug-detection dogs,177 and
observing the home with a “thermal-imaging device.”178 Preventing
officers from doing more than approaching the front door, knocking,
and leaving if not invited to stay longer would go a long way toward
preventing blatant violations of the license’s scope.179 When officers
deviate from this protocol, courts should focus on whether such
activity is customary in light of the “habits of the country[.]”180
Allowing only those actions that are “customary, usual, reasonable,
170. See id.
171. See Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932).
172. Grice, 367 N.C. at 767–68, 767 S.E.2d at 322 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
173. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1422 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“A
visitor cannot traipse through the garden, meander into the backyard, or take other
circuitous detours that veer from the pathway that a visitor would customarily use.”); see
also, e.g., United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 679–80 (8th Cir. 2011) (refusing to permit
knock and talks when police forgo the knock at the front door and proceed directly to the
backyard); Robinson v. Virginia, 625 S.E.2d 651, 659 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (en banc)
(finding that the officer was within the implied license as he walked up the driveway of the
defendant’s house).
174. See supra Section II.A.
175. LAFAVE, supra note 57, § 2.3(f).
176. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 n.3.
177. Id. at 1417–18.
178. Id. at 1419.
179. Id. at 1415.
180. See id.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (2016)

2016]

STATE V. GRICE & IMPLIED LICENSES

1379

respectful, ordinary, typical, [or] nonalarming”181 would force police
to conform more precisely to what homeowners expect and invite.
In the same vein, North Carolina could stand to learn from
jurisdictions that recognize the limits of the implied license. Other
jurisdictions limit the plain view (and open view)182 doctrine,
particularly when officers “employ a particularly intrusive method of
viewing.”183 Such jurisdictions recognize a number of factors for
determining whether an officer exceeds an implied license, such as
whether the officer acts secretly, the time of day that the entry occurs,
and whether the officer actually attempts to talk with the resident.184
Employing these factors in the Fourth Amendment analysis—and
continuing to recognize other factors when relevant—would allow a
body of case law to develop that would guide officers in how to act on
private property and instruct property owners on how much privacy
they can expect.
C.

Reemphasize the Katz Analysis

As previously explained, courts around the nation are shifting
their emphasis from the person-centric expectation of privacy analysis
espoused in Katz to an increasingly property-based analysis.185 This
Recent Development suggests reversing this shift. The trend in legal
reasoning culminating in Jardines (and even more so in Grice)
overemphasizes property rights and divorces analyses of licenses from
their proper basis: the reasonable expectation of privacy.186 Ever since
Dunn, courts increasingly employ license analyses in lieu of the
“reasonable expectation of privacy test.”187 Indeed, on paper, the two
tests are strikingly similar. After all, if an action is allowed by the
181. Id. at 1416 n.2.
182. The difference between open view and plain view is that, in open view, the
observation is made from outside rather than from within the Fourth Amendment protected
area. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 767, 767 S.E.2d 312, 322 (2015) (Hudson, J., dissenting).
183. State v. Cada, 923 P.2d 469, 477 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996).
184. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 815 P.2d 761, 769 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (listing seven
factors used in determining whether an officer exceeded the scope of “open view”); State v.
Seagull, 632 P.2d 44, 48–49 (Wash. 1981) (en banc) (finding that the officer was not acting
secretively in approaching a house).
185. See supra Section I.B.
186. See George M. Dery III, Failing to Keep “Easy Cases Easy”: Florida v. Jardines
Refuses to Reconcile Inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment Privacy Law by Instead Focusing
on Physical Trespass, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 467 (2014) (criticizing Jardines for
“eschew[ing] Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy analysis . . . [and] return[ing] to a
property-rights test”). The baseline of the Fourth Amendment’s protections is not property
rights, but rather something much more fundamental: “the right to be let alone.” See id. at
470 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
187. See supra Section I.B.
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“habits of the country,”188 it is almost certainly an action that “society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”189 But a property-based
analysis largely confines Fourth Amendment protections to the home
and curtilage and leaves objects left in barns, open fields, and certain
other places unprotected, even if their owners and society could
reasonably expect such things to be private.190 Reemphasizing the
Katz analysis would provide greater protection to privacy interests
outside the home where both individuals and society consider it
reasonable.
D. Limit the Purposes of Implied Licenses
The courts could also shore up Fourth Amendment protections
by limiting the purposes for which any person—including a police
officer—may enter Fourth Amendment protected property. Jardines
largely already requires this: “[t]he scope of a license . . . is limited not
only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.”191 However,
some courts may be tempted to reason that permitting an officer to
enter Fourth Amendment protected property “for the purpose of a
general inquiry or interview”192 would also permit that officer to enter
the property for the “purpose of discovering information.”193
However, “discovering information” is a broader purpose than
“discovering information by speaking to the occupant.”194 The courts
should closely supervise lower courts that attempt to permit searches
made with a general intent to discover information. Societal
expectations dictate the permissible purposes for approaching a
home—usually to approach the front door only.195 The Fourth
Amendment limits knock and talks to this accepted custom.
188. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013).
189. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
190. See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text.
191. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (emphasis added).
192. State v. Lupek, 214 N.C. App. 146, 151, 712 S.E.2d 915, 919 (2011) (quoting State v.
Prevette, 43 N.C. App. 450, 455, 259 S.E.2d 595, 599–600 (1979)). It should also be noted that
once a legitimate purpose is extinguished, either by its achievement or frustration, the license
is also extinguished. Cf. id. at 152, 712 S.E.2d at 920 (“Defendant repeatedly insists that Ms.
Sweatt tried to shut the door on Deputy Carroll . . . . The trial court, however, found that Ms.
Sweatt tried to shut the door only after Deputy Carroll was on the porch and had already
seen the bong.”); State v. Prevette, 43 N.C. App. 450, 455, 259 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1979)
(“Entrance onto private property for the purpose of a general inquiry or interview is
proper.”).
193. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting).
194. See id. at 1416 n.4 (majority opinion) (“The dissent argues, citing King, that
‘gathering evidence—even damning evidence—is a lawful activity that falls within the scope
of the license to approach.’ That is a false generalization.” (citation omitted)).
195. Id. at 1415.
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The above recommendations would help conform North
Carolina’s rules for police conduct more closely to the strictures of
the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, homeowners would more fully
enjoy the protections of the home and the Constitution, and police
would not be impeded in carrying out their duties—for in many cases,
not much more will be required of them beyond acquiring a warrant.
CONCLUSION
The dangers inherent in Grice stem from the decision’s lack of
clarity and thorough analysis. Jardines establishes that there are limits
to the scope of an implied license.196 The Grice court need not have
precisely implemented the above suggestions, but the court had a
duty to apply the principles handed down by Jardines in a more
meaningful way. Unconstrained police information gathering cannot
be excused by using implied license doctrine as a battering ram
against Fourth Amendment protections.197
Permitting invitees to engage in activities a guest never would
and for purposes a homeowner would never condone contradicts the
rationale underlying implied license doctrine. The people of North
Carolina deserve a clearer answer to the question: by opening my
home to guests, how much privacy do I give away? If Grice’s line of
reasoning continues, the only way to revoke the implied invitation to
police to circle the home, knock on every door and peer in every
window, is to fortify the home with barricades, gates, and high
fences.198 The home is a man’s castle, and if the Fourth Amendment
does not defend it, homeowners may build walls, gates, and moats
instead.
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196. See id. at 1417–18 (holding that an implied license does not allow the use of drugsniffing dogs to conduct a warrantless search on a homeowner’s curtilage).
197. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 762, 767 S.E.2d 312, 319 (2015) (“The implicit license
enjoyed by law enforcement and citizens alike to approach the front doors of homes may be
limited or rescinded by clear demonstrations by the homeowners and is already limited by
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the yard by a gate or by climbing a fence constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation); Fixel v.
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